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Professional Fees and Section 506(c) of




Imagine that you are a creditor holding a lien on all or most of a
Chapter 11 debtor's assets. You have feuded over details of the
debtor's plan, dealt with legal hassles, and litigated countless matters,
many of them quite minor. You have tried to cooperate with
reorganization efforts. You have even taken a substantial risk by
advancing additional funds to finance your debtor's business while in
Chapter 11. All the while you are paying your lawyers top rate fees.
After a year of efforts, your debtor just cannot make a turnaround.
Its assets will be liquidated, and hopefully will bring a sufficient amount
to satisfy your claim. Your lawyers tell you that there are no
unencumbered assets left in the debtor's estate. That means that you
may be the only party who will get paid. Then your lawyers tell you
that they must return to court once again to oppose a claim for attorney
fees. You don't understand. Why would you have to pay someone
else's attorney? It seems that, although you did not hire them, these
attorneys claim that the services they performed provided you with a
benefit. They have brought a claim under section 506(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code' and will try to show the bankruptcy court exactly
how their services provided you with some advantage. Your lawyers
tell you that although section 506(c) entitles the trustee to recover
certain expenses, some professionals have successfully argued that they
too are appropriate parties to bring a claim. You realize that even if the
claimants are unsuccessful and the bankruptcy court refuses to charge
you with their fees, the litigation will cause you even more expense and
inconvenience.
This article examines section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and
addresses the inequities that result when professionals assert section
* Associate attorney at Klett Lieber Rooney & Schorling, Pittsburgh, Pa. The author thanks
Professor Harry M. Flechtner, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, for his guidance during
preparation of this article.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988) provides: "The trustee may recover from property securing
an allowed secured claim the reasonable necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing
of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." All statutory references
throughout this article are to 11 U.S.C. unless otherwise designated. The Bankruptcy Code is often
referred to as the "Code."
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506(c) claims against secured creditors. Professionals should not be
able to advance arguments for compensation under section 506(c). By
invading a secured creditor's collateral to pay professional fees or by
charging the secured creditor itself, the bankruptcy courts are
misinterpreting a statute to favor bankruptcy professionals over secured
creditors.
II. Administrative Expenses, Adequate Protection, and Section
506(c)
When assets are distributed at the end of a bankruptcy case,
secured creditors are entitled to have their claims satisfied before any
other creditors are paid.2 After secured creditors have been paid from
the property securing their liens, administrative expenses-the costs of
running the estate 3-are given first priority in distribution under Code
section 507. Administrative expenses include the "actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries,
or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the
case."4  Section 503 of the Code authorizes an entity to file a request
for payment of an administrative expense, and generally administrative
expense claimants share pro rata.5  The priority granted to
administrative expenses furthers the Code policy of supporting a
trustee's or a Chapter 1 debtor in possession's 6 efforts to rehabilitate
the business for the benefit of all the estate's creditors.7 Generally, a
claim receives administrative expense status if it arose from a post-
petition debt; arose in connection with a transaction between the
claimant and the trustee or debtor in possession; or, in a business case,
if the claim represents a debt incurred to benefit the operation of the
debtor's business.8 For example, compensation to a trustee is treated
as an administrative expense, as is compensation to professionals, such
as a Chapter 11 debtor's attorney, and attorneys and accountants for a
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 725-26 (1988).
3. The estate created by the filing of a bankruptcy case includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
(1988).
4. !1 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 726(b) (1988). Under the Code, like claims are paid
proportionately. See infra note Il1 and accompanying text.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) gives the debtor in possession in a Chapter II reorganization the
status of the trustee. Future references to the trustee will also include, in Chapter I I cases, the
debtor in possession.
7. In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 953 (1st Cir. 1976).
8. Id. at 954; 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
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trustee.9  Administrative expenses incurred during a reorganization
usually cannot be charged against a secured creditor, but are the
responsibility of the debtor's estate."0
A bankruptcy estate's assets are subject to all liens and
encumbrances existing when the petition is filed." To assure that
liens will be respected, bankruptcy law gives a secured creditor the right
to adequate protection of its interests. 2 Adequate protection seeks to
assure that a secured creditor will not be deprived of the benefit of its
bargain as a result of the bankruptcy process. A secured creditor has
the right to protection against any decline in value that its collateral
could suffer since, absent the debtor's bankruptcy, the secured creditor
would have the opportunity to foreclose and prevent any further loss in
value of the security." In essence, adequate protection seeks to assure
that the value of a lien is maintained throughout the bankruptcy process.
For example, a creditor's security interest in a shopping center, the
Chapter 11 debtor's sole asset, was not "adequately protected" when
tenants were vacating the shopping center, yet expenses to maintain it
continued to accrue.
14
Code section 506(c) infringes on the right to adequate protection
by granting to the trustee the right to charge the secured creditor for
costs of preserving or disposing of the secured creditor's collateral.
Section 506(c) provides that "[t]he trustee may recover from property
securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving or disposing of [the property], to the extent of
any benefit to the holder" of the claim.' 5  Thus, under certain
circumstances, part of the costs of administration of the estate may be
imposed on secured parties. The rationale for charging a lienholder
with these costs is that the general estate and unsecured creditors should
9. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1988).
10. In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
11. In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Serv., Inc., 815 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1987)
(security interests must be respected by the trustee, except to the extent that they may be avoided
under the Bankruptcy Code); see also I i U.S.C. §§ 501-502.
12. Section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity
that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or
leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition
such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.
II U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). Section 361 of the Code indicates ways in which a court can provide
adequate protection for a creditor's interest in property when required by §§ 362-364.
13. In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 21 B.R. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also II U.S.C.
§§ 361-364 (1988).
14. In re Lindbergh Plaza Assocs., 115 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988).
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not be required to bear the cost of protecting what is not and cannot be
theirs. 6
When section 506(c) claims are brought, the bankruptcy court
attempts to distinguish ordinary expenses of a reorganization from
expenses properly borne by the secured creditor. Currently, courts
require that the trustee or debtor in possession prove that: (1) the
expenditure was necessary; (2) the amounts expended were reasonable;
and (3) the creditor benefited from the expenses. 7 Alternatively,
imposing certain expenses and charges upon a secured creditor is held
to be appropriate where the secured creditor has consented to the
expenditure in question.' 8 Courts will usually purport to allow
expense recovery only for benefits to the secured creditor that are
quantifiable. 9  Recovery is disallowed if the asserted benefit is
indirect, remote or merely hypothetical. 20  For example, a debtor in
possession could not recover expenses for caring for the livestock that
served as a secured creditor's collateral, since the debtor in possession
had an independent duty to care for property in his possession and did
not apply the proceeds from the livestock to the secured creditor's
debt.2' While many courts insist that a secured party may only be
charged when it is "directly" or "primarily" benefited by the expense,
the "benefit" to the secured creditor has nevertheless been interpreted
broadly. 2  For example, preservation of going-concern value (i.e.,
keeping the debtor in business) has been deemed a benefit to the
secured creditor, since it may provide the secured creditor with a greater
return than would otherwise be obtained.23
Courts are split as to whether a party other than the trustee or
debtor in possession can bring suit directly against a secured creditor to
recover costs and expenses under section 506(c). The language of
16. In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Note that under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor, after default, may simply take the
collateral and need not contribute to the cost of its upkeep. U.C.C. § 9-504(l) (1990). When a
bankruptcy petition is filed, § 362(a) of the Code imposes an automatic stay whereby creditors
cannot act against the debtor or the debtor's property.
17. E.g., In re Delta Towers, Ltd., 924 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Cascade Hydraulics &
Utility Serv., Inc., 815 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1982).
18. E.g., In re Annett Ford, Inc., 64 BR. 946 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
19. In re Staunton Indus., Inc., 74 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
20. E.g., In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Hospitality Ltd., 86
B.R. 59, 63 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
21. Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1984).
22. E.g., In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Afco Enter.,
Inc., 35 BR. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
23. In re McKeesport Steel, 799 F.2d at 94-95.
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section 506(c) gives only the trustee the right to recover. 24  A literal
reading of the statute suggests that as a basis for recovery, the costs
must have been expended by the estate. Thus, the debtor in possession
or the trustee, acting on behalf of the estate,25 is the proper party to
seek recovery under section 506(c). Nothing in the language of the
statute appears to create an independent cause of action in favor of
attorneys or other professionals against the holders of secured claims or
their collateral, even if the professionals have conferred a benefit on the
secured party by preserving or enhancing the value of the collateral.
Accordingly, one line of authority limits recovery under section 506(c)
to trustees and debtors in possession.26 Even former trustees have
lacked standing to assert a claim under section 506(c).27 Under this
analysis, attorneys for the debtor or creditors' committees and other
bankruptcy professionals are precluded from asserting a claim to
recover fees and expenses under section 506(c).
21
Other courts favor a more liberal standing rule.29 Several have
followed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which allows a claimant
to apply directly for administrative expenses under section 506(c) where
the claimant can demonstrate that it has conferred a benefit on the
secured party and the trustee himself will not assert a claim.30 The
24. See supra note 1.
25. A Chapter 11 trustee acts on the authority of the court and is charged with the duty of
operating the debtor's business. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1988). The trustee's duties are delineated in
§ 1106(a). The rights, powers and duties of a debtor in possession are outlined in § 1107(a).
26. E.g., In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys. IMFS, Inc., 71 BR. 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1987) (employee benefit funds denied standing to proceed under § 506(c) against secured creditor);
In re Proto-Specialties, Inc., 43 BR. 81 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984) (debtor's landlord denied standing);
In re Manchester Hides, Inc., 32 B.R. 629 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (debtor's attorneys do not
have standing); In re S & S Indus., Inc., 30 B.R. 395 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (creditors'
committee does not have standing).
27. In re JR. Research, Inc., 65 B.R. 747 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (only a fiduciary of the
estate may pursue a 506(c) claim; thus, after conversion from Chapter II to Chapter 7, the power
to pursue the claim devolved to the Chapter 7 trustee, leaving the Chapter 11 trustee without
standing to advance a 506(c) claim).
28. E.g., In re Manchester Hides, Inc., 32 B.R. 629 (Bankr. N.D.Iowa 1983); In re Codesco,
Inc., 18 BR. 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
29. E.g., In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1991) (residents of Chapter 1
debtor's residential development may bring a 506(c) claim); In re Wilson Freight Co., 21 BR. 398
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (counsel for unsecured creditors' committee); In re McKeesport Steel Castings
Co., 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986) (utility company).
30. In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1986) (the rule that
individual creditors cannot act in lieu of the trustee is often breached when sufficient reason exists
to permit the breach); see also In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504, 511 (1st Cir. 1991)
(claimant has standing since debtor in possession has no incentive to make the claim); Fulcrum
Int'l Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 BR. 141, 145 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (whether a particular claimant
has standing will turn on facts of each specific case).
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rationale advanced by the Third Circuit is that, in these circumstances,
the claimant is the only one who will zealously pursue the claim.3'
Courts advance tenuous reasons, 32 or none at all, for extending the
availability of 506(c) claims to other parties. Some courts routinely
entertain 506(c) claims without addressing the issue of standing, thus
furthering the implication that the facts of the particular case justify
charging the holder of a secured claim with expenses or fees. For
example, an implied right to seek attorney's fees under section 506(c)
was recognized by a federal district court in In re Wilson Freight Co.
33
The Wilson Freight court allowed counsel to the creditors' committee
interim fees under section 506(c) based upon a finding that the
committee was very active and had "taken a very strong position in
preserving and protecting the assets which have benefited all who have
an interest in the assets, including the secured party."34
In Fulcrum International Ltd. v. Saybrook Manufacturing Co.,"
a broker sought to proceed under section 506(c) after the debtor's
attempted reorganization had failed. No unencumbered assets were left
from which the broker could be paid as an administrative claimant, and
the debtor refused to press for the broker's fees under section 506(c).
Despite the "plain language" of the statute, the district court decided
that a claimant should have standing to bring a 506(c) claim when he
can show that he is entitled to reimbursement from the secured
creditor's collateral and that the trustee or debtor in possession refuses
to bring the claim himself.36  In other words, a claimant must first
show that the secured party directly benefited from the rendition of
services or provision of goods by the administrative claimant. If the
court decides the secured party did in fact realize some benefit, then the
claimant will have standing. The Fulcrum International court decided
that the broker's services had "substantially benefited the debtor and
[its] creditors., 37 That finding led the court to hold that the broker had
standing to seek recovery of his fees under section 506(c). 3' A
31. McKeesport Steel, 799 F.2d at 94.
32. One court, in granting a landlord standing to assert a 506(c) claim to recover from the
secured creditor rent owed by the debtor, justified its decision partly by explaining that while the
statute specifies that the trustee may recover costs from a secured creditor's collateral, it "does not
definitively state that no other entity may do so." In re Staunton Indus., Inc., 74 B.R. 501, 504
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
33. 21 B.R. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
34. Id. at 400.
35. 124 B.R. 141 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
36. Id. at 145.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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secured creditor, who had advanced post-petition funds to the debtor in
exchange for superpriority status, 39 was charged for the services.4"
III. Professional Fees
The availability of section 506(c) to parties other than the trustee
invites professionals in bankruptcy cases to seek their compensation
from a secured creditor's collateral.4 Under this view, the reasonable
value of the services of the trustee's counsel or counsel for creditors'
committees can be recovered under section 506(c) from a secured
creditor's collateral where a court finds the attorney's services, although
performed for his client, nevertheless benefited the secured creditor. As
a result, some ordinary expenses common to a reorganization may be
imposed on a secured creditor.
Professionals will look to section 506(c) despite alternative
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code supplying them with avenues for
payment.42  Typically, the issue arises when the Chapter 11
reorganization has failed. Often, few or no unencumbered assets remain
to satisfy administrative expense claims against the estate and one or
two secured creditors hold liens on the debtor's assets. The
professionals want to get paid somehow. The professionals request
payment out of the secured creditor's collateral under section 506(c),
asserting that the services they performed as counsel to other parties
provided some benefit to the secured creditor.43
39. Section 364 of the Code offers "superpriority" status to a lender who is willing to
advance funds to a bankrupt debtor. The lender gets reimbursed before administrative expenses.
40. Fulcrum Int'l, 124 B.R at 145.
41. See, e.g., In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., 86 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Loop
Hosp. Partnership, 50 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1985).
42. Section 330, for example, provides for compensating bankruptcy attorneys at the same
level as attorneys rendering comparable services in other fields. The compensation for most
services rendered by an attorney during a Chapter 1 proceeding is treated as an administrative
expense (§ 503(b)(2))and given first priority status under § 507(a)(1). Pursuant to § 331, awards
for professional services may be made on an interim basis.
43. While this is the typical scenario, other scenarios exist. For example, in In re New
England Carpet Co., 28 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D. Vt 1983), af'd, 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), the court
had not yet taken action on the Application for Interim Compensation made by attorneys for the
Chapter 11 debtor, based on the debtor's insolvency and its cash flow problem. The case
converted to Chapter 7, leading the attorneys to look to § 506(c) as a basis for their petition for
payment. Id. at 770. In other cases, attorneys fail to apply for compensation before the case is
converted. Counsel then find themselves behind not only the secured creditor, but behind Chapter
7 administrative expense claimants. The only way to get to the front of the line is by asserting that
the secured creditor benefited by their legal services. E.g., In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.1L 225, 226
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Judicial consideration of fee and expense claims made by
professionals under section 506(c) usually involves an examination of
the necessity and reasonableness of the services performed and, most
importantly, the effect of the service for which the claimant seeks
compensation.44 Recovery under section 506(c) is limited to the extent
of the benefit the court finds has accrued to the secured creditor. The
courts also consider whether the creditor in any way consented to or
caused the expenses.45
The majority view holds that a creditor's security interest in
collateral has priority over attorneys' claims for professional services,
and any fees payable out of the security must represent reimbursement
for services that were for the benefit of the secured creditor rather than
the debtor or other creditors.46 A number of courts follow the lead of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and recognize that expenses for the
preservation or disposition of property incurred primarily for the benefit
of a secured creditor, if properly identified, may be charged against a
secured creditor.47 A secured creditor's collateral will not be invaded,
however, simply because the estate has no unencumbered assets from
which to pay expenses and the possibility exists that the professionals
will not get paid.48 In In re Flagstaff, the Second Circuit reasoned that
the creditor was oversecured at the start of the Chapter 11 case, so it
could not be said that the work of the debtor's lawyers benefited the
creditor within the meaning of section 506(c).49
Meanwhile, other courts will construe "benefit" quite broadly when
looking for a way to compensate a claimant that would otherwise be
shortchanged despite his priority status granted by section 507(a).5"
Since the estate has no unencumbered funds from which to pay the fees
and expenses of professionals, the only alternative is to place the
obligation on the one party that has any money-the secured creditor.
Section 506(c) serves as a convenient device to force the secured
creditor to share. While recovery is granted under a finding that the
44. E.g., In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Serv., Inc., 815 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
45. E.g., In re Hotel Assoc., 6 B.R. 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
46. E.g., In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Blue Ridge
Motel Assocs., 126 B.R. 477, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n,
89 B.R. 719, 727 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988).
47. In re Flagstaff, 739 F.2d at 76.
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 76.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
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secured creditor was enriched in some way, the underlying rationale
seems to be a practical concern that the professionals get paid.
This kind of logic can be seen in cases like In re Loop Hospital
Partnership5 and In re Afco Enterprises.52  In Afco, the secured
creditor argued that it could not possibly have benefited from the
activities of the trustee, the trustee's accountant, or the trustee's
attorney, since during reorganization efforts, the property's fair market
value decreased while the secured indebtedness increased. "
Nevertheless, the Afco court found that benefits had accrued to the
secured creditor. The court reasoned that even though the fair market
value of the property declined during the trustee's administration, the
secured creditor benefited, since, without the trustee's efforts, the value
of the property would have declined even further.54 The court went
on to find that had it not been for the trustee's efforts in keeping the
business open, the eventual sale price would have been lower." While
the court found it "difficult to measure in dollars and cents" the extent
of the benefit to the secured creditor, it managed to assess over $7,000
in trustee's fees, and almost $60,000 in attorney and accountant fees.56
The figure was reached by calculating the going concern value of the
business; "whether or not [the secured creditor] was able to realize the
going concern value, the opportunity to do so was valuable to it.""
The Afco court, determined to provide the professionals with
compensation for their services, speculated that the secured creditor
could have been enriched, even though quantitatively it was not. This
kind of decision ignores the language in section 506(c) requiring that
recovery may be had only to the extent of any benefit to the secured
party.
58
Likewise, the Loop Hospital Partnership court awarded debtor's
counsel over $63,000 in fees, to be taken out of sale proceeds, despite
the secured creditor's arguments that (i) counsel's services provided it
with no benefit, (ii) counsel's services were duplicative, and (iii) the
fees were "administrative" and not directly related to preserving or
selling the bank's collateral.59 As justification for their claim, the
51. 50 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1985).
52. 35 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
53. Id. at 514.
54. Id. at 516.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 518.
57. In re Afco Enter., 35 B.R. at 517 (emphasis added).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 72-92.
59. In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 50 B.R. 565, 572 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1985).
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debtor's attorneys pointed out that the debtor's principle asset was sold
at a price which would allow the secured creditor to recover, and that
the sale had quickly resolved the case. The court agreed with debtor's
counsel, and reasoned that all the legal services, including
"administrative legal services," furthered the end result of the very sale
that produced a return to the bank.6" The court viewed the "diligent
prosecution of a Chapter 11 by competent counsel" as a benefit to the
secured creditors, noting that had the property been sold at foreclosure,
recovery might have been limited solely to the first mortgagee.6'
Similar reasoning led another bankruptcy court to award over
$70,000 to the trustee's counsel - his own law firm - and over
$200,000 to the trustee's special counsel after a failed reorganization
case.62 In North County Place, the trustee used post-petition financing
to complete construction of buildings on the debtor's property and
attempted to lease the premises. The trustee's efforts failed and
eventually the secured creditor foreclosed. Subsequently, the trustee
asserted a 506(c) claim against the secured creditor. Despite the
secured creditor's objections to surcharge, the court found that the
secured creditor derived a benefit from the services by reasoning that
had the trustee abandoned the property at the outset, the secured
creditor would have undertaken the same course of action as the
trustee.63 The court would not, however, limit the surcharge amount
to reflect what the secured creditor would actually have had to
spend. 64  The secured creditor argued that it derived no quantifiable
benefit from the leasing operations, since it was oversecured at the time
the case was filed, but barely fully secured at time of foreclosure. 65
But the court found that even though the property value had
depreciated, the leasing of the buildings contributed to their value, thus
conferring a benefit on the secured creditor.66 Although the court
recognized that the attorney fees were "substantial," the court
nevertheless decided the amount was warranted, because the attorneys
had spent a "significant amount of time reassuring existing and
prospective tenants" of the viability of the debtor's rental property.67
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In re North County Place Ltd., 92 B.R. 437 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
63. Id. at 446.
64. Id. at 449.
65. Id. at 446.
66. Id. at 447.
67. In re North County Place, 92 B.R. at 450.
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IV. Statutory Language
A. Who May Recover?
The plain language of section 506(c) does not give professionals
a right to recover fees from a secured creditor's pocket, and its
legislative history does not suggest otherwise. Section 506(c) simply
states that the trustee is able to surcharge a secured creditor's collateral.
Attorneys, accountants, and other professionals do not share the rights
and duties of either the trustee or the debtor in possession in a
bankruptcy case. The statute does not encompass the broad notion that
anyone who benefits a secured creditor must be compensated by the
secured creditor. By awarding professional fees under section 506(c),
courts are bypassing the meaning of unambiguous statutory language in
order to obtain preferred results.
The legislative history of section 506(c) neither expressly nor
impliedly indicates that section 506(c) was meant as a provision that
could be resorted to by landlords, brokers, accountants, attorneys or
other claimants. Congress's intent in enacting section 506(c) was to
ensure that anytime the trustee or debtor in possession "expends money
to provide for the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of
preserving or disposing of a secured creditor's collateral, the trustee or
debtor in possession is entitled to recover such expenses from the
secured party, or from the property securing an allowed secured claim
held by such party. ' 6 Furthermore, section 506(c) provides that the
trustee may recover from property the costs and expenses of preserving
or disposing of it. This language contemplates that the trustee has
already paid the expenses in connection with preserving or disposing of
the collateral. On its face, the provision applies to money spent by the
estate that went towards preserving or disposing of encumbered assets.
The basis for recovery is that the costs were paid by the estate, and that
the trustee, acting for the estate, is the proper party to seek
reimbursement under section 506(c).6"
Application of section 506(c) should be limited to charging the
security with only those expenses actually incurred by the trustee in
preserving the collateral or in making the sale.70 When professionals
seek compensation under section 506(c), the trustee has not paid the
68. H.R. REP. No. 11089, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 124 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6436, 6451 (Statement by Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added).
69. In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
70. Id. at 230.
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fees. Since no amounts have been expended by the estate, section
506(c) cannot serve as a basis for recovery. In fact, in some instances
where professionals invoke section 506(c) to recover fees and expenses,
the bankruptcy trustee or the debtor actually opposes the claim.7
Equally significant is that section 506(c) allows the trustee to
recover certain expenses "from property." These words should mean
that the trustee cannot collect from a secured creditor under section
506(c) until -the collateral is sold or abandoned to the secured
creditor.72 Yet courts have imposed in personam liability on secured
creditors before that point.73 This practice is unfair, since it ignores
the possibility that the secured creditor's liability for the 506(c) claim
could exceed the amount eventually received for the collateral itself.
B. The Benefit Requirement
The "benefit" required by section 506(c) should mean that the
activity behind the cost or expense must have served to increase the
secured creditor's recovery or eliminate expenses that otherwise would
have been borne by the secured creditor.74 When courts attenuate the
benefit requirement, courts are slighting, or in some cases, completely
ignoring the secured creditor's existing right to adequate protection. 75
In other words, courts are finding that secured creditors "benefit" from
what they are already entitled to receive. Adequate protection requires
that the secured creditor's interest be preserved, i.e., protected from any
decrease in value attributable to the automatic stay76 created by
bankruptcy law. A secured creditor's interest in collateral is not
adequately protected if the property is depreciating during bankruptcy
proceedings.77 But in cases where the indebtedness to the secured
creditor has increased or the value of its collateral has decreased, 506(c)
claimants nevertheless insist a benefit accrued to the secured creditor,
and in return the remaining collateral should be further reduced by the
71. Fulcrum Int'l Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 BR. 141, 145 (M.D. Ga. 1991); In re
Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719, 735 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988).
72. See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration,
70 N.C. L. REv. 417, 433-35 (1992).
73. E.g., In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., 86 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Wilson
Freight Co., 21 B.R. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
74. E.g., In re Ruggio, 49 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985); In re Belew, 44 B.R. 12,
13 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984).
75. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 16.
77. United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 370
(1988).
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amount of fees and expenses requested.7" Despite specific evidence
that the security interest was not enhanced or preserved (for example,
its value declined), a court following the reasoning of In re Afco79 may
speculate as to how worse off the secured party may have been had the
services not been performed at all. Indeed, the Afco court, in finding
that "opportunities" not realized by the secured party nevertheless
benefited it," ignored section 506(c)'s specific provision that costs and
expenses will be recoverable only to the extent of the benefit to the
secured party.
Similarly, in In re North County Place,"' the secured creditor's
collateral was not "preserved," since the trustee allowed the property to
become run-down. The property's value deteriorated, and unpaid
property taxes reached $150,000. The attorneys' services could not
have furthered "disposal" of the property, since the property was never
successfully marketed. When the stay was finally lifted over the
trustee's objections, the secured creditor bore the expense of
foreclosure. Yet, despite the statute's design to extract from an asset the
cost of its preservation or disposition to the extent it benefited the
secured creditor, the court awarded over $300,000 in fees to the
trustee's lawyers.8" Also without regard for the statute's benefit
requirement, the Loop Hospital Partnership83 court determined that the
debtor's attorneys should be paid by a secured creditor since all the
legal services furthered the end result of the sale, which produced a
"return to the banks." 4 Courts have failed to consider that the secured
party is merely getting the benefit of its bargain-what adequate
protection is designed to protect-and, instead, have viewed the secured
creditor as somehow reaping an advantage.
Imposing professional fees on a secured party by reasoning that the
services contributed to a favorable price at sale also ignores the
possibility that a favorable price not only allows payment to the secured
party but can benefit shareholders and other creditors as well.
78. E.g., In re Afco Enter., Inc., 35 B.R. 512, 515 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
79. 35 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
80. Id. at 516.
81. 92 B.R. 437 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
82. In re North County Place, 92 B.R. at 450. Additionally, the court awarded fees, via §
506(c), to accountants ($12,000) and to one of the debtor's owners ($100,000), who acted as
"manager" of the property during reorganization efforts. Id.
83. In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 50 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1985).
84. Id. at 572. In reality, one can safely assume that a debtor's attorneys' efforts are directed
solely towards the interests of the debtor. And, in most instances, a bankrupt debtor's interests
are probably not in protecting his creditors.
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Moreover, services provided to maintain a facility may help keep it in
good condition and eventually facilitate future disposition. But courts
fail to consider that when the collateral is being utilized, some of the
costs go to benefit the debtor's reorganization, or the business itself, as
well. 5
Courts are not only undermining the right to adequate protection,
but are skewing the Code's priority rules as well. Broad construction of
the extent of benefits accruing to secured creditors disturbs a basic
premise of bankruptcy rules: secured creditors get paid first. It is
fundamental that a secured party is entitled to full priority over junior
creditors.8 6 The policy of the Code is that, generally, the expenses of
general administration of the estate should be borne by the portion of
the estate not secured by liens.87 When the debtor's assets are
encumbered by a security interest, only surplus proceeds are available
for pro rata distribution among unsecured creditors and administrative
claimants. By construing the extent of section 506(c) benefits too
broadly, courts are giving certain administrative claimants priority over
a secured party. In In re Hotel Associates,8 for example, the court
extended coverage of section 506(c) to fees sought by the bankruptcy
trustee and his attorneys since the secured creditor had moved for
appointment of a trustee, had failed to ask for the lifting of the
automatic stay, and was aware that the debtor's estate was heavily
encumbered. 9  The Hotel Associates court supported its.holding by
stating that "[a] relaxed liberal interpretation of the [word] 'preserving'
is necessary here to negate the possibility of the trustee or his agents
not being paid after having expended their valuable time in the
85. It is usually after reorganization efforts have failed that a court begins to address 506(c)
claims made by claimants other than the trustee or debtor in possession. At this point, the debtor's
business has failed, so the court views the secured creditor as the party with the most interest in
the property's preservation. The courts, favoring the 506(c) claimant, seem to ignore the fact that
during reorganization efforts, a debtor in possession not only has a strong interest, but also has a
distinct duty to care for property in its possession. See Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron,
738 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1984).
86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
87. In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1983); In re American Resources
Management Corp., 51 B.R. 713, 719 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re New England Carpet Co., 28
B.R. 766, 771 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).
88. 6 B.R. 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
89. Id. at 109. Pursuant to § 330 of the Code, the court may allow reasonable compensation
to the trustee for his services. Section 326 of the Code fixes the maximum compensation of a
trustee. Under § 327, a trustee may retain counsel to assist it with certain duties. In In re Hotel
Assocs., the court gave the trustee and his attorneys assurance that they would be paid by the
secured creditor in the event the reorganization failed. In re Hotel Assocs., 6 B.R. at 114.
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performance of their court ordered duties."9  The court, primarily
concerned "with paying the professionals," placed little significance on
the fact that section 506(c) recovery is premised on some benefit to the
secured creditor.
The courts should not use section 506(c) to impose on the secured
creditor administrative costs that are normally the responsibility of the
debtor's estate.9 Imposing administrative costs and expenses on a
secured creditor's collateral or on the holder of a secured claim elevates
the administrative claimant to a preferred status. This preferred status
is similar to creation of a lien that is senior to that of the secured party
and contravenes the priority provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Since section 506(c) provides an exception to the rule that
administrative expenses are not payable from the debtor's estate subject
to liens, the exception should be applied restrictively.92 Chapter 11
proceedings are always initiated with the hope of rehabilitating the
debtor, and professional fees are always incidental to reorganization
efforts. Courts are expanding the scope of section 506(c) by finding
those incidental expenses to have conferred some benefit on the secured
creditor. As a result, courts are inviting all administrative claimants to
bring 506(c) claims against any secured party.
Administrative claimants may get shortchanged by the Chapter 11
debtor. While that is contrary to their first priority status in section
507(a),93 section 506(c) should not be used as a cure.94  The
bankruptcy court, the trustee, creditors, and professionals working for
those parties should be alert to the debtor's financial condition and
insure that its ability to pay administrative expenses is accurately
divulged.
V. From the Perspective of the Secured Creditor
When sufficient unencumbered assets are unavailable to administer
a Chapter 11 estate, a threat exists that the Chapter 11 case will be
sustained largely at the expense of secured parties. Imposing
professional fees on unconsenting secured creditors under the above
rationales may discourage wary creditors from supporting debtors'
90. Id. at 113.
91. In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Serv., Inc., 815 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. In re New England Carpet Co., 28 B. 766, 771 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983), afftd, 744 F.2d
16 (2d Cir. 1984).
93. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
94. See In re P.C., Ltd., 929 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1991).
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reorganization efforts.95  Before a case is converted to Chapter 7
liquidation, many businesses run up thousands of dollars of legal and
accounting bills in addition to continuing operating losses. As a result,
payments to creditors are diminished. 96
Charging the secured party with professional fees in effect
penalizes the secured party for cooperating. For example, in In re
Wilson Freight Co. ,97 the secured creditor had financed the debtor for
several decades. After the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, a
bankruptcy judge suggested, during a conference, that the creditor may
want to abort the Chapter 11 proceedings by taking possession of the
collateral in which it claimed an interest. Instead, the secured creditor
tried to keep the debtor afloat by advancing additional funds. The
secured creditor, in trying to help the debtor get back on its feet,
ultimately was stuck with the bill to pay counsel for the unsecured
creditors' committee, since the secured creditor did not specifically
object to the order allowing retention of such counsel.9"
The result in In re North County Place, Ltd.99 was equally
astounding. There, the lender advanced $2,000,000 in post-petition
financing. The trustee allowed the property to deteriorate and its value
declined. The trustee could not successfully manage nor market the
property. Over the trustee's objection, the court finally granted the
lender relief from stay to permit a foreclosure sale. Later, the court
ordered the lender to foot the bill for professional fees, suggesting that
the lender itself was to blame, since throughout the bankruptcy
proceedings it "never requested that any of the services not be
performed."1 °°
Chapter 11 reorganizations often depend on a lender's willingness
to advance additional funds.'' A post-petition financier incurs the
95. In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. Going For Broke: Most Small Businesses Find No Exit from Chapter 11, 8 CRAiNS
DETROIT BUS. no. 35, Aug. 31, 1992, § 1, at 1.
97. 21 BR. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
98. Id. at 399-400.
99. 92 B.R. 437 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
100. Id. at 445.
101. Often a debtor needs an infusion of funds to keep the business going. Because unsecured
credit is often difficult to obtain during reorganization efforts, § 364 of the Code gives
superpriority status to a post-petition lender. In other words, the lender who advances funds to
a Chapter I I debtor is entitled to priority over all unsecured claims and administrative expenses.
Among the administrative expenses that are reduced in priority is compensation awarded to
professionals under § 330. But despite superpriority status given to creditors who supply post-
petition funds, those creditors have nevertheless been charged with successful 506(c) claims. E.g.,
Fulcrum Int'l Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 B.R. 141 (M.D. Ga. 1991); In re Afco Enter., Inc.,
35 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
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risk that the debtor's efforts will fail, and the value of its collateral will
decrease. But lenders facing the kind of liability imposed in Wilson
Freight and North County Place will be even more hesitant to finance
a business in Chapter 11. The additional risk of having to pay large
legal fees of professionals not employed by the creditor will further
discourage creditors from financing reorganizations. Faced with these
risks, secured parties will be less likely to cooperate and more likely to
seek immediate relief from stay.
Moreover, a secured creditor's interest in its collateral is a
substantive property right created by nonbankruptcy law, which may not
be substantially impaired when bankruptcy intervenes. 2 The Code
allows few liens to be validly subordinated to administrative
expenses. 0 3  Section 506(c) allows some impairment in limited
circumstances. But indiscriminate charges to secured parties impair the
secured parties' property rights in the collateral and nullify the adequate
protection that the Code affords secured parties.1°4 To respect that
protection, administrative claimants should be looking only to surplus
proceeds for payment.
While the bankruptcy court tries to protect professionals from
inequity, inequities to the secured creditor are overlooked. Secured
parties are often captive to reorganization proceedings and must incur
their own counsel fees in the course of protecting their secured
positions. Secured parties lose their immediate right to foreclose due
to the automatic stay. Often secured parties must monitor the debtor's
management of the property, which creates additional expense. In
many cases, the market for and value of a debtor's assets erodes during
bankruptcy. Yet these considerations have not caused some courts to
hesitate before charging secured creditors with expenses of the debtor's
bankruptcy. Indeed, some courts have made perplexing statements that
seem to imply that secured parties should help fund a debtor's
bankruptcy. In North County Place, for example, although attorney fees
were "very substantial" - over $200,000.00 - the amount was
nevertheless found to be "reasonable" within the meaning of section
506(c), and surcharge for the full amount warranted, since "the
102. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (mortgagee's acquiescence in
bankruptcy proceedings should not cause him to experience a forfeiture of part of his interest).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 724(b) and (d) provide that tax liens and other statutory liens whose priority
is determined in the same manner as a tax lien (for example, an ERISA lien) may be subordinated
to administrative expenses.
104. The concept of adequate protection is derived from the Fifth Amendment protection of
property interests. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11092 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295.
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[debtor's] bankruptcy made it much more expensive to negotiate leases
with commercial tenants."'10 5
VI. Pro Rata Distribution of Administrative Expenses
One object of the Bankruptcy Code is equality of distribution to
similarly situated creditors. 6 All administrative claims accruing in
the same chapter shall be paid pro rata.1°7 Post-petition attorney fees
are not superior to other Chapter 11 administrative expenses and should
not be given priority over existing liens or other administrative
expenses. By invoking section 506(c), professionals are asking that the
court create a special priority for professional fees over other Chapter
11 expenses.
To allow one administrative claimant standing to assert a 506(c)
claim is to violate the Code's pro rata policy, since the 506(c) claimant
may get paid while other similarly situated creditors may recover little
or nothing. In effect, the liberal standing rule results in priorities of
payment within the same class of claimants, since one claimant is given
a special opportunity to override the distribution scheme created by the
Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, it is feasible that charging a secured creditor
with professional fees under section 506(c) would leave more
unencumbered assets available to pay other administrative claimants.
Other administrative claimants could actually benefit, since they would
105. In re North County Place, 92 B.R. at 450 (emphasis added). Equally difficult to explain
is the imposition of general expenses associated with a bankruptcy upon a secured creditor. In In
re Grant Assocs., 154 BR. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), for example, a secured creditor was forced to
pay debtor's counsel fees for services that included, among other things, over $18,000 worth of
"general services." "General services," as described by debtor's counsel, included preparing "the
involuntary Chapter 11 petition [for the debtor's general partner], [preparing] the Schedules and
Statements of Affairs, [and providing] legal advice to the debtor relative to its obligations to
maintain and operate its sole asset, . . .for the benefit of thefirst mortgage holder." Id. at 839 n.7
(emphasis added).
A secured creditor's collateral is often valued by determining the amount a buyer would pay
for it, reduced by the expected costs of a sale. David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and
Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 N.C. L. REV. 417, 422 (1992). The valuation amount
becomes what the secured creditor would realize if the collateral were sold. Yet with section
506(c), the court is extracting additional transaction costs from the secured creditor. A secured
creditor, then, can in effect pay twice for the same transaction. Id.
106. In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys. IMFS, Inc., 71 B.R. 741, 744 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1987).
107. See I I U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a), 726(b) (1988). An attorney working for a party in a
Chapter 11 proceeding can file a claim for an unpaid bill, which will be given priority as an
administrative expense under § 507(a). But when Chapter 11 cases are converted to Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings, the administrative claims filed under Chapter 7 get priority over
administrative claims filed under Chapter 1I. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).
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be left with one less claimant with whom they would have to share. If
that were the case, the fact nevertheless remains that the successful
506(c) claimant gets paid first and in full, while other administrative
claimants must share in unencumbered assets. Moreover, professionals
do not look to section 506(c) when the debtor's estate has sufficient
unencumbered funds to satisfy administrative claims. The claims are
made when the Chapter 11 estate has no unencumbered assets" 8 or
when a Chapter 11 case has been converted to a Chapter 7
liquidation."9 Only then do professionals look to section 506(c) for
payment. In these cases attorneys realize that they will not get paid as
administrative claimants. Since the attorneys have nothing to lose, they
attempt, through further litigation, to prove that their services benefited
a secured creditor.
Section 726(b), applicable to Chapter 7 cases, likewise expresses
the policy that all administrative claimants shall be reimbursed pro
rata.10  To allow one administrative claimant to collect from a
secured creditor under section 506(c), as some courts have done, is to
ignore the equality of distribution required by section 726(b)."'
Moreover, once a Chapter 11 case is converted, Chapter 7
administrative expenses have priority over any costs of administration
108. E.g., In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); Fulcrum Int'l,
Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 B.R. 141, 144 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1991); In re Pullman Constr.
Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 942 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1989); In re Afco Enter., Inc., 35 B.A 512, 513
(Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
109. E.g., In re Blue Ridge Motel Assocs., 126 B.R. 477, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re
Baum's Bologna, Inc., 50 B.R. 689, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa 1985); In re New England Carpet Co.,
28 B.R. 766, 770 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 226 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982).
The vast majority of businesses in Chapter 11 never make a turnaround. Studies show that
reorganization attempts are successful only approximately 26% of the time. Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM.
BANK.R. LJ. 99, 100 (1983). Thus most firms end up in liquidation. Id. Other sources estimate
that the chances of a small or medium sized business surviving a Chapter 11 bankruptcy are about
one in ten. In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) provides:
Payment on claims of a kind specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7) of
section 507(a) of this title, or in paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) of this
section, shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind specified in each such
particular paragraph, except that in a case that has been converted to this chapter under
section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this
title incurred under this chapter after such conversion has priority over a claim allowed
under section 503(b) of this title incurred under any other chapter of this title or under
this chapter before such conversion and over any expenses of a custodian superseded
under section 543 of this title.
I11. In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 227-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Interstate Motor
Freight Sys. IMFS, Inc., 71 B.R- 741, 744 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
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attributable to the Chapter 11 reorganization efforts. 112 Section 726(b)
confers superpriority status on administrative expenses incurred in
subsequent liquidation proceedings." 3  Hence professionals are
tempted to look beyond the estate for a source of compensation for
services performed during the Chapter 11 case. Courts ignore the policy
behind section 726(b), which favors payment of Chapter 7 expenses, by
permitting Chapter 11 professionals to recover their fees via section
506(c) while Chapter 7 administrative claimants must share pro rata or
may go unpaid.
Moreover, a claim for recovery under 506(c) belongs to the estate,
not to any individual or independent entity. When the trustee recovers
under section 506(c), the recovery is for the benefit of the estate; it is
not compensation to the trustee." 4  The availability of recovery
assumes that estate assets were utilized to preserve or dispose of a
secured creditor's collateral." 5  It is the estate which is to be
reimbursed for the expenditure of its assets in the preservation or
disposal of a secured creditor's collateral." 6  Thus, if the trustee
recovers, the funds go into the estate and will be part of the pro rata
distribution to all administrative claimants.
By granting independent standing to professionals, courts allow
professionals to sue a secured creditor directly. When a professional is
allowed to assert his own 506(c) claim directly, the professional is not
required to pursue the cause of action on behalf of the estate."'
Instead, the professional asserts his claim for his sole individual benefit.
If a professional succeeds in recovering his fees and expenses, he is
personally reimbursed for his claim; the estate does not receive the
funds. That permits the professional claimant to circumvent the pro rata
distribution policy by elevating his administrative claim to a prioritized
position. Meanwhile, other administrative claimants might receive
nothing or will share pro rata. Courts are radically changing the
distribution of the estate and violating the Code's pro rata policy. To
112. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988); see supra note 109.
113. The superpriority status for expenses after conversion was intended to provide an
incentive to encourage the trustee and professionals to participate in Chapter 7 cases. In re
Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
114. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 506.06, at 506-56 (15th ed. 1989); see also In re Great
Northern Prod., Inc., 135 B.R. 46, 68 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); In re Dinsmore Tire Center, Inc.,
81 BR. 136, 138 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
115. In re Codesco, Inc., 18 BR. 225, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
116. In re J.R. Research, Inc., 65 B.R. 747, 750 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
117. Note that if courts give effect to the unambiguous language in § 506(c) and allow only
the trustee to surcharge, a creditor could conceivably be entitled to sue a secured creditor on behalf
of the trustee, for the benefit of the estate, when the trustee fails or refluses to do so.
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the extent a professional expended personal assets in preserving
collateral, his remedy should be limited to pursuing an administrative
claim against the estate.
VII. Inconsistencies and Wasteful Litigation
Extension of the standing rule to parties other than the trustee and
debtor in possession has only served to exacerbate two existing
problems. First, the overwhelming degree of inconsistency among the
bankruptcy courts has been a major area of criticism. In one
jurisdiction a bankruptcy professional may see an opportunity to
surcharge the holder of a secured claim for its fees when other avenues
do not look promising. There, secured creditors may be discouraged
from supporting debtors' reorganization efforts, knowing they could
eventually be saddled with professional fees. In a sister jurisdiction,
however, counsel must wait in line with other administrative claimants
and risk getting little or nothing. In still another jurisdiction, the rule
may not be definitive, so a party may decide to try to proceed under
section 506(c) and hope the court rules in its favor. Uncertainty has led
to a second problem: wasteful litigation, which contributes to the clog
in the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy cases can linger on for years,
partly because the excessive number of cases has overloaded the
bankruptcy courts."' When bankruptcy judges entertain arguments
that stretch Code provisions to imaginative extremes, they are
contributing to the delay.
Enabling any party to proceed under 506(c) encourages more
litigation, since every unpaid administrative claimant will be able to sue
a secured creditor under 506(c) to recover asserted costs or
expenses." 9 This will place secured creditors in a position that forces
them to monitor or object to the activities not only of bankruptcy
professionals, but of any administrative claimant. 20 If a secured
118. In 1991, 71,549 businesses filed for Chapter 11 protection. Can Chapter 11 be Put Back
Together?, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Apr. 27, 1992, at 16. The number of personal bankruptcies
may hit one million in 1993. Id.
119. The variety of claimants includes auctioneers (In re Wyckoff, 52 B.R. 164 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1984), investment bankers (In re Knudsen Corp., 67 B.11 254 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1986), and
residents in a housing development (In re Parque Forestal, 949 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1991).
120. At least one bankruptcy court has suggested that a secured creditor, to limit its exposure
to surcharge under § 506(c), should request that services not be performed. In In re North County
Place, Ltd., 92 B.R 437 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988), the court surcharged a secured creditor for the
trustee's counsel fees under section 506(c) since counsel spent a significant amount of time
negotiating rental property leases and the secured creditor offered no evidence that it requested
that any of the services at issue not be performed. Id. at 445. Other cases imply as much by
holding the secured creditor responsible for expenses because the creditor failed to object to certain
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creditor must specifically object to the -incurring of certain expenses of
a reorganization proceeding to protect itself from charges, more time
and money will be wasted and more costs will be incurred by the debtor
in opposing the objections. 2 ' The prospect of being held responsible
for administrative expenses means more legal fees for a secured creditor
in resisting 506(c) claims, and means greater hesitancy to support a
debtor's reorganization efforts. In some cases, the trustee or debtor in
possession strongly opposes the claim.'22 Nonetheless, the bankruptcy
judge may entertain the claim by granting the third party standing to
proceed on his own behalf. Each dollar spent by the estate for legal
fees in opposing the 506(c) claim reduces the amount ultimately left to
pay off other creditors. Likewise, when a secured creditor does consent
to pay limited, designated expenses to give the debtor a chance to
reorganize, it should not be interpreted as blanket consent to additional
administrative expense charges.' 23
If the trustee and debtor in possession are the only eligible
claimants under section 506(c),' 24  much confusion, clutter, and
inconsistency could be avoided. Time and money should not be
expended to sort out 506(c) claims made by a variety of parties.
Lengthy opinions addressing the propriety of charging a secured party
with professional fees under various rationales would be unnecessary if
the courts would follow a strict standing rule. By loosely defining the
rule, bankruptcy judges are inviting an onslaught of creative and often
frivolous arguments.
activities or cooperated with reorganization proceedings. In In re Wilson Freight Co., 21 B.R. 398
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court found significance in the bank's failure to object to an order
allowing the unsecured creditors' committee to retain counsel. Id. at 399. But even when a
secured creditor specifically requested that services not be performed, the secured creditor was
made to pay for the services. In re Cann & Saul Steel, 86 BR. 413, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
121. In re Korupp Assocs., 30 B.R. 659, 663 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
122. E.g., In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719, 726 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988).
123. In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 762 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
124. This general rule could still be subject to one exception. In some cases, the secured
claimholder expressly consents to the expense. In that instance, the secured claimholder's
agreement to the expense would indicate that it expected some benefit from it. Inevitably, though,
the exception could lead to unintended results when parties allege that the secured creditor
consented in one way or another and the secured creditor denies any such consent. The consent
theory should not be advanced with the rationale that since a creditor sought the aid of the
bankruptcy process, cooperated with the bankruptcy reorganization, or did not move to lift the stay,
that the creditor agreed to payment of costs and expenses thereby incurred. But see In re Annett
Ford, Inc., 64 B.R. 946, 947 (D. Neb. 1986) (expenses incurred during the preservation effort
should be paid out of the liquidation fund, particularly where the creditor agreed to the effort); In
re Hotel Assocs., Inc., 6 B.R. 108, 114 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (secured creditor gave implied
consent to charges against its collateral when it chose to move for appointment of a trustee rather
than relief from stay).
SECTION 506(c) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Decisions like In re Chicago Lutheran Hospital Ass'n,'25 In re
Loop Hospital Partnership,126 and In re Cann & Saul Steel Co.
27
will create even more litigation in bankruptcy cases. In Cann & Saul
Steel, the secured creditor had a lien on all of the debtor's assets. The
secured creditor had unsuccessfully sought relief from the automatic
stay, and from the start had expressly refused to consent to allow any
estate assets to be used to pay professional fees. The debtor failed to
successfully reorganize. Consequently, debtor's counsel, and the
accountant and counsel for the unsecured creditors' committee, sought
compensation under section 506(c). The professionals argued that
services relating to preservation of the collateral, general administrative
services, and even services performed in litigation against the secured
creditor itself benefited the secured creditor. The Cann & Saul court
decided that determining what amounts are collectible requires a
"subjective and objective assessment" of the professionals' actions. 28
The professionals were partially successful and were granted
compensation for services performed that, in the court's view, benefited
the secured creditor.'29 Those services included "efforts" by the
professionals to implement a bailment agreement, 30 to reduce utility
company demands, and to reduce pension benefits. Also compensable
were services performed in sale negotiations and work on a
reorganization plan "undertaken to accommodate the bank."''
Services that the bank "reasonably and specifically requested they not
perform" were not compensable. '32 Nor could the professionals be
compensated for services rendered in litigation against the bank.'33
The Cann & Saul reasoning encourages professionals who look to
objecting secured parties for fees to describe their services ds services
performed to accommodate the secured creditor. It further suggests that
even when a secured creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay,
objects to reorganization efforts, objects to professional fees coming out
of estate assets, and notifies professionals in advance that it will not
finance their activities,' 34 the secured creditor may still be subject to
125. 89 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988).
126. 50 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
127. 86 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
128. Id. at 414.
129. Id. at 418.
130. Counsel negotiated an agreement whereby Westinghouse Electric purchased raw materials
which the debtor manufactured for Westinghouse. Id. at 418.
131. Id.
132. In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., 86 B.R. at 418.
133. Id.
134. In In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., the bank, at an early stage of the bankruptcy, dispatched
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payment of professional fees." 5  Even when a secured creditor
specifically requests that services not be performed at all, if the court
deems the request to be an unreasonable one, the service may be
compensable.' 36
In In re Chicago Lutheran Hospital Ass'n,' all the debtor's
assets were subject to HUD liens or IRS liens. During unsuccessful
reorganization efforts, the debtor had lost some $700,000 of HUD's
collateral. Thereafter, the attorneys for the Chapter 11 debtor and
attorneys for the unsecured creditors' committee moved to obtain
compensation pursuant to section 506(c), both asserting that their
services, in one form or another, benefited HUD. The debtor's
attorneys' fees amounted to well over $100,000. The trustee, the IRS,
and HUD opposed the applications. The bankruptcy court
acknowledged that the exception to the general rule that administrative
expenses are charged against the estate only applies when the expenses
have been incurred primarily for the benefit of the secured creditor.'
Nevertheless the court spent 11 pages of its opinion addressing the
attorneys' claims. The court considered each service performed, and
how or if that service affected the secured creditor. In the end, only
those services that the court deemed beneficial to the secured creditors
were compensable.' 39  Although the amount awarded was small
compared to the amount requested, the Chicago Lutheran opinion
nevertheless opens the door for more 506(c) claims. The court has
invited attorneys to try to demonstrate some benefit to the secured
creditor.
When entertaining 506(c) claims made by professionals, courts
seem to have restitutive principles in mind. Some courts, in favoring
a liberal standing rule, suggest that since the purpose underlying section
506(c) is to make the secured creditor pay for benefits it has received,
to deny the party that conferred the benefit the ability to be reimbursed
would grant the secured creditor a windfall. 4 Yet no court has
a letter disclaiming financial responsibility for professional services. The court nevertheless
ordered the bank to pay for certain services. In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., 86 B.R. at 418.
135. Id. at 418.
136. Id.
137. 89 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
138. Id. at 727.
139. Id. at 729. Beneficial services included those rendered in connection with the sale of the
debtor's property. Id. at 731. Services rendered in connection with the transition of control of the
estate from the debtor to the trustee were also compensable, since the debtor was a poor manager
and transition helped preserve the secured creditor's collateral. In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp.
Ass'n, 89 B.R. at 728.
140. E.g., In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719, 726 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988).
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explained why the professionals can collect from a third party in a
bankruptcy proceeding when they would not have a claim outside of
bankruptcy should the same scenario exist. These parties could not
claim reimbursement under common law restitution principles.
In the United States, the right of an attorney to recover for
professional services must rest on the terms of the contract of
employment and cannot be based on any benefit derived by a third
party from the services rendered by the attorney. 4' This is consistent
with the general principle that the mere fact that a third person benefits
from a contract between two others does not make the third person
liable on a theory of quasi-contract or restitution.142 Therefore, a
lawyer assisting a mortgagor, for example, during foreclosure
proceedings, could not collect his fees from the mortgagee, even if the
lawyer's services benefited the mortgagee.
Courts have fashioned an exception to the general rule, based on
the restitutive concept that an attorney who performs services in
creating, preserving or protecting a fund should in equity be allowed
compensation out of the fund from all those who seek a benefit from
it.' The object of the common fund doctrine is to prevent unjust
enrichment by spreading the costs of attorney fees proportionately
among members of the class having a common interest in the fund.'"
But the common fund doctrine would not be available to the
professionals invoking section 506(c) in the above scenarios. The
interests represented by attorneys working for the trustee, debtor in
possession or unsecured creditors' committee are not the same interests
as those of a secured creditor. When assets are encumbered, the parties
represented by these attorneys are not in the same class as a secured
party. Thus the lawyer representing a debtor during bankruptcy
proceedings could not invoke the common fund doctrine to recover fees
from the debtor's creditors, since a bankrupt debtor and the debtor's
creditors do not share the same interests; the debtor is not acting as a
representative of his creditors and the creditors do not share the rights
of the debtor during bankruptcy.'45
141. Insurance Co. of North America v. Norton, 716 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1983).
142. See Insulation Contracting & Supply v. Kravco, Inc., 507 A.2d 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986).
143. Insurance Co. of North America v. Norton, 716 F.2d at 1116.
144. Volkman v. United Transp. Union, 770 F. Supp. 1455, 1474 (D. Kan. 1991).
145. See In re Key West Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 54 B.R. 978, 985 (Bankr. D. III. 1985);
In re Mortgage Investors Corp., 136 B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (counsel representing
mortgagor in suit against mortgagor's debtor did not have claim to payment from fund created
which would be superior to mortgagee's, even though attorney alleged that the primary focus of
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IX. Conclusion
More often than not, Chapter 11 reorganizations fail. During the
effort, however, many failing debtors encumber every last bit of their
property. Section 506(c) has been improperly utilized by professionals
who do not want to be shortchanged, and by bankruptcy courts looking
for a way to pay administrative expenses. By recognizing these 506(c)
claims, bankruptcy courts are contributing to excessive litigation, delay,
expense, and inconsistencies that already exist in the bankruptcy arena.
Courts have different and sometimes inappropriate ideas about what
constitutes a "benefit" to secured parties, and legal arguments are often
nothing more than judicial conclusions. A loose definition of the
benefit required by section 506(c) often undermines a secured creditor's
right to adequate protection and fosters abuse of a secured creditor's
cooperation in bankruptcy proceedings.
Administrative claimants should not be encouraged to look to
encumbered property as a source of payment for their claims.
Bankruptcy law entitles secured creditors to have their claims satisfied
first. First priority status for secured creditors is negated when post-
petition attorneys' fees, which are administrative expenses, attain
priority over existing liens via section 506(c). Even superpriority status
conferred on creditors who supply debtors with post-petition funds has
been impaired in some cases. While attorneys and other professionals
spend considerable time on a bankruptcy case, and while the Code
attempts to assure they are justly compensated, the rule remains that a
bankruptcy court's discretion to allow payment of professional fees and
other administrative claims ahead of valid liens is restricted by the
existence of unencumbered assets. A secured creditor's interest should
not be impaired because the debtor's estate cannot cover the fees of
professionals not employed by the secured party. Only when the estate
has incurred expenses primarily for the creditor's benefit or when the
secured creditor has consented or stipulated to waive its lien or
superpriority to pay certain administrative expenses should the collateral
be invaded.
Payment to professionals under section 506(c) is equally unfair to
other administrative claimants when unencumbered assets are
insufficient to pay off all of the administrative costs. When one
administrative claimant can assert a section 506(c) claim, that claimant
is in effect given a special opportunity to elevate its status to a
his legal services was to protect mortgagee's collateral and to maximize realization on that
collateral).
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prioritized position. The pro rata policy of the Code is undermined,
since that claimant may get paid first and in full, while other
administrative claimants must share pro rata. Moreover, recovery under
section 506(c) should benefit the estate. By allowing an individual
claimant to use the provision for his own benefit, courts are taking an
end run around priority rules. What is supposed to be an asset of the
estate is being appropriated by a single administrative claimant.
Congress encouraged professionals to participate in Chapter 11
cases by providing for their compensation. But Congress did not
remove all the risks from the practice of bankruptcy law and did not
guarantee the payment of fees. In every bankruptcy case there is
uncertainty over whether the estate will have sufficient property to pay
administrative expenses in full. 4 6  Risks of nonpayment or partial
payment are well known to bankruptcy practitioners. Nonpayment or
partial payment may occur due to an adequate protection shortfall under
section 507(b),'47  superpriority borrowing under section 364,
excessive administrative expenses, insufficient unencumbered assets in
the bankruptcy estate, or conversion of the case and subordination of
Chapter 11 expenses under section 726(b). 4 ' The secured creditor
should not be charged with these risks.
Section 506(c) and its legislative history are plain and
unambiguous. The statute should be enforced accordingly.' 49 If
parties in bankruptcy proceedings other than the trustee or debtor in
possession are to have the opportunity to surcharge a secured creditor
pursuant to section 506(c), that opportunity should be granted by
Congress, not the bankruptcy court.
146. H.R. REP. No. 124, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11092 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6512 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
147. Section 507(b) provides that a secured creditor who is entitled to adequate protection has
a first priority claim to the extent that the protection has not been adequate. Whereas adequate
protection shields the creditor in the first instance from impairment of his interest in the property,
the § 507(b) superpriority was intended to recapture value unexpectedly lost during the course of
a case. In re Callister, 15 B.R. 521, 528 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
148. See In re Blue Ridge Motel Assocs., 126 B.R. 477, 480 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re
American Resources Management Corp., 51 B.R. 713, 721 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
149. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).

